178 Major Websites Infected in One Day: The Optimizely Malware Attack Explained

For most of 16 November 2026, some of the most visited websites on the internet were quietly serving their visitors malware. Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock — 178 organisations in all — were caught in a supply-chain attack that turned a trusted piece of website software into a thief. It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed payment-card details and pushed exploit kits at iPhone users. The attack was not discovered by any of the companies involved. It was found by an independent security researcher checking scripts, and by the time the findings went public, most of the damage was already done.

A laptop showing a red warning shield, linked by a chain of browser windows with one broken red link — illustrating the Optimizely supply-chain malware attack that hit 178 major websites.

What happened on 16 November

The attack ran through Optimizely Web, a widely used platform that lets companies run A/B tests on their websites. Each customer loads a small JavaScript snippet from Optimizely's content delivery network, cdn.optimizely.com, and that snippet can carry a field called Project JavaScript — custom code the customer writes itself. According to security monitoring company Report URI, an attacker wrote their own code into that field across many unrelated customer projects. The rest of each snippet was untouched, and the file was still served from Optimizely's own domain, with Optimizely's own security certificate — so browsers and security allowlists treated it as legitimate.

The first injection Report URI found was in the BBC's snippet at 04:21 UTC on 16 November, two hours after the last clean capture. The main malicious script appeared on bbc.com at 08:28 UTC. By the evening, Report URI had checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found 188 infected, belonging to 178 organisations. The injected loader was just three lines: it pulled a second-stage script, track.js, from a domain the attacker had registered that morning, 1688360.cc. The payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day as the attacker refined it.

How one trusted script reached 178 sites at once

This is what security researchers call a supply-chain attack, and it is the reason this incident matters beyond the number of sites hit. None of the 178 organisations' own servers needed to be breached. They all trusted the same vendor, and the vendor's delivery channel carried the attacker's code for them. Optimizely confirmed to Cointelegraph that an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account sign-up flow to add the malicious JavaScript to customer projects. How exactly the attacker got in remains unknown — Report URI says it does not know whether a compromised Optimizely system, a stolen credential with access across customers, or something else was responsible — and Optimizely had not published a public statement at the time of writing.

The campaign has been dubbed "OPTIMJACK" by independent researcher Amirul Iman. The name is new; the technique is not. Supply-chain attacks work precisely because the compromised component is trusted: the malicious file came from a host every affected site had deliberately allow-listed, so the usual defences never fired. It is the same lesson as the week's bigger AI story — Google's confirmation of the first fully automated AI cyberattack — and the deepfake campaigns that impersonate real people: the most dangerous code is the code you already trust.

What the malware actually did to visitors

The payload did four things at once. First, it acted as a crypto clipper: it swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses in page text, form fields, links and the clipboard, replacing the address a visitor intended to use with one controlled by the attacker. Second, it skimmed payment cards — capturing card numbers, expiry dates and CVV codes typed into checkout forms, and sending them to the attacker's server. Third, it stole cookies and screenshots of the pages visitors were viewing. And fourth, on iPhones and iPads it loaded two iOS exploit kits, Coruna and DarkSword, keyed to the device's iOS version.

The known theft so far is modest in money but large in implication. By 19:25 UTC on 16 November, the attacker's wallets had received about $7,040 in cryptocurrency — mostly Bitcoin, in four transactions — according to blockchain records checked by Cointelegraph; a separate analysis by cybersecurity firm StepSecurity put the figure at roughly $6,600. The card-skimming and cookie theft are harder to quantify, and may never be fully counted: a skimmed card can be used weeks later, and a stolen session cookie can let an attacker into an account without a password at all.

The cleanup — and what is still unknown

The clean-up was fast once the problem was public. Report URI recorded a mass removal between about 20:40 and 21:10 UTC on 16 November: 169 snippets were still infected at 20:56 UTC, and by 21:52 UTC only one remained — belonging to UK broadband provider TalkTalk. Ledger's snippet was cleaned at about 20:41 UTC. But one independent re-check in the early hours of 17 November found the attacker's payload server still answering requests, serving the full malicious file — so the infrastructure behind the attack had not been taken down, only cut off from Optimizely's delivery channel.

Three questions remain open. Nobody has explained how the attacker gained write access to 178 customer projects. Optimizely has confirmed the vulnerability to a reporter but has not published a public account. And nobody knows how many visitors were actually affected, or what was taken from them — the sites involved collectively attract millions of visitors a day, and the malicious code ran for most of 16 November before it was found.

What to do if you visited one of the affected sites

If you visited Zoom, the BBC, CNN or any of the other named sites on 16 November, there is no need to panic — but a few checks are worth making. If you copied a cryptocurrency wallet address from one of those sites that day, verify the transaction went to the address you intended, and check the address against the one you copied. If you entered card details into a checkout form, watch your statements for unfamiliar charges and consider asking your bank for a replacement card. If you browsed on an iPhone or iPad, make sure your device is running the latest iOS version. And website owners using Optimizely Web should follow Report URI's advice: open every project's Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code and look for 1688360.cc or any script they did not write themselves.

The Optimizely attack will be remembered less for the $7,000 stolen than for what it proved. A single trusted vendor, compromised once, turned 178 of the world's biggest websites into malware distributors for a day — and nobody inside any of them noticed. The code that hurt people was not smuggled past their defences. It was delivered by a system they had invited in, signed with a certificate they trusted, from a domain they had allow-listed. That is the supply-chain problem in one sentence, and it will not be fixed by any single company patching its own site. It will be fixed only when the software every website trusts is treated as part of the website's own security — because, as 16 November showed, it already is.

 

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